FSB sets out its priorities for 2027

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Ref: 17/2026

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) met on 16-17 November in Basel. Members discussed vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system, developments in artificial intelligence (AI), stablecoins, crisis preparedness, the nonbank financial sector, and the work programme for the coming year.

Once a year, the Plenary places a special emphasis on the perspectives of emerging market and developing economies, and at this meeting those issues were highlighted in a number of sessions. The Plenary also discussed developments in the funding, structure, and governance of global standard-setting for audit, assurance, ethics, and independence.

Financial system vulnerabilities

While the financial system has remained resilient, members highlighted several risks to financial stability. Government bond yields have reached multi-decade highs and debt servicing costs are rising. The surge in debt issuance underpinning the AI investment boom could create significant debt-servicing pressures and default risks if AI valuations or revenues fall short of expectations. Members also discussed the growing prevalence of leverage in sovereign bond markets – notably by nonbank financial intermediaries – and the financial effects of extreme weather events. An important concern is that a major shock could trigger several vulnerabilities simultaneously.

The Plenary also discussed the potential financial stability implications of vulnerabilities in the insurance sector, such as those related to asset-intensive reinsurance and private credit.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)

AI technologies continue to evolve. The rapid adoption of AI offers significant benefits to productivity and economic growth. However, the emergence of advanced AI models has increased risks to the financial system. The Plenary stressed the importance of ongoing monitoring of AI developments and discussed possible additional work, including on operational resilience, the nexus between AI and fraud, and whether existing FSB work should be updated for the latest AI developments.

Crisis preparedness

The FSB is conducting a strategic review of its crisis preparedness activities to ensure that they continue to fulfil the breadth of its mandate in a changing financial system and respond to emerging vulnerabilities. The Plenary received an update on this work and agreed that the FSB’s future crisis preparedness work should focus on better connecting crisis preparedness activities with identified vulnerabilities, strengthening coordination along the crisis continuum, and reinforcing the role of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. Members also discussed the next stage of the review, which will assess how the FSB’s current practices and organisational arrangements align with these objectives.

Stablecoins

The Plenary discussed the findings of work on stablecoins undertaken by the FSB, and other standard-setting bodies and international organisations this year, in light of the FSB’s 2025 Thematic Peer Review on the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities, including whether further action is needed in addressing them. The Plenary noted the importance of fostering cross-border cooperation and information sharing given the cross-border, cross-sectoral nature of global stablecoins. This included addressing the particular challenges faced by EMDEs.

The Plenary discussed potential next steps for the FSB’s stablecoin work in 2027, including a stock take on the interplay of regulatory and supervisory frameworks across borders.

Nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI)

The FSB discussed the medium-term direction of its work to enhance resilience in NBFI. The work is organised around analysing vulnerabilities, addressing data gaps, assessing implementation and facilitating supervisory information sharing. This approach will remain agile in response to evolving risks and market developments. The Plenary discussed a proposed public consultation on metrics to monitor vulnerabilities related to leveraged trading strategies in sovereign bond markets. The Plenary also discussed members’ ongoing work to implement the FSB’s 2025 NBFI leverage recommendations and considered possible follow up work in some areas.

FSB work programme

The Plenary discussed the FSB’s work programme for 2027, including possible deliverables to the United Kingdom’s G20 Presidency. Priorities for 2027 include advancing work on AI, global stablecoins and NBFI, and progressing the G20 Roadmap to Enhance Cross-border Payments. The finalised work programme will be published in early 2027.

Notes to editors

Jurisdictions use a variety of terms to refer to Artificial Intelligence, including “Super Intelligence” and advanced technologies.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Virtual outreach event on FSB Regulatory and Supervisory Modernisation Principles

On 15 December 2026 at 13:00-15:00 CET the FSB will host a virtual event as part of the consultation process for its proposed regulatory and supervisory modernisation principles.

The Financial Stability Board published a consultation report on Regulatory and Supervisory Modernisation Principles, on 14 October 2026. These principles aim to promote greater alignment among authorities and help ensure that regulatory and supervisory frameworks remain effective and responsible as they evolve.

As part of its consultation, the FSB will host a virtual outreach event on Tuesday 15 December from 13:00-15:00 CET. The event aims to inform stakeholders about the consultation and to gather preliminary perspectives on the topics covered in the consultation report.

Register for the event

Registration closes at midday CET Monday 14 December.
The event will be recorded and may be published on the FSB website.

Further work by jurisdictional authorities and private sector necessary to enhance cross-border payments

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Ref: 16/2026

  • Progress towards the G20 Cross-border Payments Roadmap’s goals of cost, speed, access and transparency remains gradual and uneven across payment segments and jurisdictions.
  • FSB calls for action at the jurisdictional level by both G20 and non-G20 countries to translate the significant international efforts to date into tangible improvements.
  • FSB highlights the critical role of the private sector in advancing the Roadmap’s objectives and calls for continued engagement with market participants.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published its 2026 consolidated progress report on the actions taken by the FSB, the Bank for International Settlements Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and other partner organisations under the G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-Border Payments.

In 2026, the international community intensified efforts to support and encourage jurisdictions to adopt the toolkits and recommendations developed under the Roadmap. The report highlights the role of the International Monetary Fund’s and World Bank’s Technical Assistance programmes in supporting countries and regions address their specific challenges and develop tailored practical responses. To encourage implementation, the FSB invited jurisdictions to develop action plans setting out concrete steps to advance the Roadmap’s goals, while using its Regional Consultative Groups more actively. However, despite these efforts, progress in the end-user experience, as measured by the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), remains gradual and uneven across payment segments and jurisdictions.

To translate the significant international efforts to date into tangible improvements, action at the jurisdictional level by both G20 and non-G20 countries is crucial. Engagement with the private sector is equally critical to advancing the Roadmap’s objectives as they have a key role to play in implementing many of the changes needed to improve cost, speed, access and transparency, including through modernising existing systems and adopting novel technologies. Continued engagement with market participants focused on practical barriers to execution will be important to translate the Roadmap’s policy work into measurable improvements for end-users.    

As the Roadmap approaches its end-2027 milestone, the FSB is committed to working with other international organisations and industry to encourage and promote implementation in order to achieve faster, cheaper, more transparent, and more inclusive cross-border payments while maintaining their safety and security.

Notes to editors

In 2020, the Saudi Arabian G20 Presidency made enhancing cross-border payments a priority and asked the FSB to coordinate a G20 Roadmap. Developed with the CPMI and other partner organisations, the Roadmap prioritised actions to make cross-border payments faster, cheaper, more transparent and accessible. In 2021, the G20 endorsed global quantitative targets, most of which are to be achieved by end-2027.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

G20 Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-border Payments: Consolidated progress report for 2026

| PDF full text (787 KB)

The goals to make cross-border payments faster, cheaper, more transparent and more inclusive whilst maintaining safety and security remain as important as ever.

In 2020, the G20 launched the Roadmap to enhance wholesale and retail cross-border payments and remittances globally, aiming to make them cheaper, faster, more inclusive and more transparent.

The international community of the FSB, Bank for International Settlement’s Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, and partner organisations has now largely completed the international policy work envisaged in the 2020 original Roadmap and its 2023 update. However, progress in improving the end-user experience, as measured by the key performance indicators for cost, speed, access, and transparency, remains gradual and uneven across regions and segments.

This report outlines the progress made in 2026, examining implementation challenges and practical responses, including with the private sector to support and monitor implementation across the three priority themes of:

  1. payment system interoperability and extension
  2. legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks
  3. cross-border data exchange and message standards

Looking ahead, a sharpened focus on actions at the jurisdictional and regional levels, and continued partnership between private and public stakeholders are vital to achieving the goals of the Roadmap.


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Financial stability in a rapidly changing world

Keynote speech by FSB Chair, Andrew Bailey, at the IOSCO Conference: 25 years of standard setting from Madrid and of stakeholder engagement

The views expressed in these remarks are those of the speaker in their role as FSB Chair and do not necessarily reflect those of the FSB or its members.

Thank you for the invitation to speak to you today.

I want to discuss two of the most difficult challenges in managing systemic risk. The first is transparency: whether market participants can see and understand the risks building in the system. The second is how we identify what is, and what is not, a systemic risk.

These issues are closely connected. A risk that is visible, understood and capable of being priced may be manageable. A risk that is opaque, interconnected and poorly understood can become destabilising very quickly.

As we approach Black Friday, an exciting day for shopping markets, I want to illustrate those challenges by looking back at a less enjoyable day for financial markets: Black Monday.

Back in 1987, just four years after International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) was founded, we learnt that a lack of transparency can greatly amplify stress in a crisis. By transparency, I do not mean perfect information. Markets will always operate under uncertainty. The issue is whether material information gaps prevent participants and authorities from understanding and managing risks, particularly how stress might spread through the system.

Capital markets were becoming increasingly international and the need for cooperation among securities regulators was clear. The founding of IOSCO reflected an important insight: markets do not stop at national borders, and effective regulation cannot do so either.

IOSCO’s initial focus was on sound securities markets and protecting investors. In 2013 its mandate expanded to include systemic risk, giving transparency a new importance. IOSCO’s former Secretary General David Wright identified four enduring themes: tackling risks before they build; creating risk-identification infrastructure; addressing the data deficit; and improving cross-border enforcement and compliance. He also warned that fragmentation would be a major challenge.

IOSCO has since made solid progress, working with the Financial Stability Board, the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and through its own Financial Stability Engagement Group. As an IOSCO Board member when FSEG was established, I have seen its importance in developing IOSCO’s perspective on systemic risk. Yet material information gaps remain.

Let me turn back to Black Monday in October 1987. The Dow fell 22.6% in a single trading session and the S&P 500 fell 20.47%. The sell-off spread across the world.

The Brady Commission, established in the United States to investigate the crash, identified inadequate cross-market information as a central problem. Activity in futures markets had driven down equity prices, yet no real-time, cross-market information or coordinated tracking mechanisms helped participants understand what was happening. Fear of the unknown intensified asset sales.

Important reforms followed, including multi-tier circuit breakers, aligned margining rules and better coordination among regulators. But cross-market dynamics remain a challenge. When participants cannot see what is happening, they fill the gap with assumptions. In stress, those assumptions are often negative. Risk becomes uncertainty, uncertainty becomes fear, and defensive behaviour produces contagion.

The same issue was evident in the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Creditors ultimately recovered significantly more than market pricing at the height of the crisis suggested, and some recovered 100%. Was the market wrong to be so concerned? No. The market was right to be concerned because it could not see how serious the problem was.

The deeper lesson is the need for visibility across an interconnected financial system. Participants need to understand exposures, legal entities, collateral, contractual relationships and possible channels of contagion. Otherwise stress can spread, not necessarily because every institution is insolvent, but because no one can be confident about who is exposed to whom.

Nearly forty years after Black Monday, the sources of opacity have changed but their capacity to amplify shocks has not. Let me give two examples.

The first concerns sharp market movements following US tariff announcements in April last year. Bond markets moved significantly, but it was not immediately clear why. The spike in long-maturity US Treasury yields was unprecedented and difficult to interpret. Explanations ranged from changing inflation and growth expectations to fiscal concerns, foreign demand and the unwinding of leveraged positions.

This points to a broader vulnerability. The composition of investors in government bond markets has changed. Traditional investors such as pension funds have become less active, while hedge funds and other leveraged non-banks play a larger role. Pension funds tend to pursue longer-term strategies. Leveraged hedge funds can build and unwind exposures much faster as conditions change.

We saw the implications in the UK earlier this year. During the most significant volatility following the onset of the Middle East conflict, moves in gilt yields were amplified by hedge fund deleveraging. Net hedge fund borrowing in gilt repo markets fell by around 40% between December 2025 and mid-April 2026.

Hedge fund participation is not itself a problem and can provide liquidity in normal times. The vulnerability arises when highly leveraged positions unwind rapidly. Neither market participants nor authorities always have a sufficient picture of those positions, especially where they span borders and jurisdictions.

This is precisely what the FSB’s Nonbank Data Task Force was created to address. Its first test case focuses on leveraged trading strategies in sovereign bond markets. More broadly, it is examining how authorities can identify vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector and how better information sharing, including data, can mitigate threats to financial stability.

Cooperation between the FSB and IOSCO is essential, and I am grateful for IOSCO’s engagement. We cannot conclude that information sharing is simply too difficult. But visibility is only part of the solution. Authorities must also implement the policy measures in the FSB’s 2025 leverage recommendations.

The second example is private credit. The FSB has highlighted uncertainty about valuations, leverage, liquidity, underperforming loans, lending terms, borrower concentration and links among private credit funds, banks, insurers and other investors.

This does not mean private credit will necessarily harm the system. It means its resilience is difficult to assess when information is incomplete and assets are not continually priced or traded. The absence of visible stress should not be mistaken for the absence of risk.

Some ask why we keep looking at private credit when it is not large enough to move the global financial system. The answer is interconnectedness. It may not move the system alone, but it could be one domino in a chain reaction. Shared exposures among banks, insurers and funds could amplify a shock. If markets can imagine that possibility and lack facts to counter it, they will act on the concern.

This echoes Brady’s fear of the unknown. Contagion remains central to financial stability because a problem in one market can spread through common exposures, collateral calls, margin requirements, forced sales, liquidity withdrawals or a simple loss of confidence. That makes it dangerous to believe we can judge precisely what is, and what is not, a financial stability risk.

Global systemically important banks are not identified by size alone. Interconnectedness, complexity, cross-border activity and the difficulty of substituting for their functions also matter. Since the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, the FSB has increasingly used the language of institutions that can be ‘systemic in failure’. This directs attention to an institution’s connections at the point of failure and how distress may transmit through the system.

An institution or market can therefore become a key risk without appearing exceptionally large. It may become a domino in a chain reaction driven by fear, and that fear may arise from a lack of transparency. We do not need certainty that something will cause a systemic problem before examining it. We need to understand its connections well enough to know what might happen if confidence disappears.

This leads to an obvious question: how large, or how connected, must private credit become before it poses a financial stability risk? Stablecoin arrangements raise similar, if distinct, questions. Timely information about reserve composition, redemption mechanisms, custody, governance and operational dependencies can be missing. The issue is not simply market capitalisation, but whether lost confidence could generate rapid redemptions or disrupt a function important to wider markets.

In each case, we must examine exposures, liquidity arrangements, counterparty concentration, substitutability and the speed at which confidence can deteriorate. Information gaps and growing interconnections mean private credit and stablecoins could become financial stability risks sooner than conventional size measures suggest. That is why forward-looking surveillance matters. We should not wait for a risk to become large before examining its potential to generate contagion.

Greater transparency is not an end in itself. It must enable authorities and market participants to form a more accurate view of where risk sits, how it is financed and how it might move. That requires information which is timely, comparable and usable across legal entities and borders. A large stock of fragmented data is not the same as a clear view of the system. The tariff episode also illustrates why explanations formed in real time can be unreliable. Some participants focused on inflation expectations; others on fiscal concerns, growth, foreign demand for US assets or leveraged unwinds. Several of those forces may operate together. Without a better view of positions and flows, authorities can see the market move without being able to distinguish a change in fundamentals from an amplification mechanism.

That distinction matters for policy. We should not seek to prevent markets from adjusting to new information. Price discovery is essential. But we should seek to prevent hidden leverage, concentrated positioning or abrupt liquidity demands from turning an orderly repricing into a destabilising spiral.

The aim is resilient market-based finance, not the elimination of market movement. Private credit presents a different version of the same challenge. The assets are less frequently traded, valuations are less observable and contractual terms vary. Risk can therefore appear subdued for longer. But delayed recognition is not the same as resilience. When credit quality deteriorates, uncertainty over valuations, financing arrangements and links to banks and insurers may cause participants to reassess several exposures at once. Stablecoins add questions about the composition and custody of reserves, the credibility of redemption mechanisms, operational dependencies and governance. A loss of confidence can move quickly because redemption incentives are immediate.

The relevant question is whether the arrangement can meet those demands without forced asset sales, disruption to payment or trading activity, or transmission to institutions performing related functions.

Across these examples, size remains relevant but is not decisive. A smaller institution or market can become systemic in failure if it performs a hard-to-replace function, is connected to many counterparties or triggers common defensive behaviour. Conversely, a large activity may be manageable where exposures are transparent, liquidity is robust and credible arrangements exist for stress. This is why surveillance must combine quantitative indicators with judgement.

Authorities need to examine leverage, liquidity, concentration, substitutability and operational dependencies; run stress analysis; compare information across sectors; and consider how confidence might change behaviour. They must also be willing to investigate plausible transmission channels before conventional indicators flash red. International cooperation is indispensable. Activities and exposures cross borders, while data and legal powers remain organised largely by jurisdiction.

Effective cooperation requires common definitions, proportionate reporting, secure mechanisms for sharing information and a willingness to resolve obstacles rather than accept them. The FSB can bring the system-wide view; IOSCO can bring deep knowledge of securities markets and their regulation. Together, they can turn fragmented information into a clearer assessment

Conclusion

Let me finish where I started, with Black Monday. The financial system today looks very different from the one that experienced the crash of 1987. But the central lesson is the same: what we cannot see can matter just as much as what we can.

In 1987, opacity about activity and exposures across markets amplified uncertainty and contagion. Today, opacity takes different forms: private markets, leverage, complex interconnections and new forms of finance. The risks did not then, and do not now, lie neatly within one market or one regulator’s remit. Understanding them requires authorities to look across markets and borders.

That is why the relationship between IOSCO and the FSB matters. IOSCO’s principles have established common expectations around regulation, supervision, cooperation and market integrity. IOSCO and the FSB have also worked together on vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector, including liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds, margining practices and leverage. The aim is to prevent stress in particular markets or institutions from being amplified across the wider financial system.

IOSCO’s work with CPMI is equally important, covering margining, clearing, recovery and the resilience of financial market infrastructures. Central clearing does not remove risk. But it can make exposures more visible, standardise risk management, improve default management and reduce uncertainty about who owes what to whom.

The relationship between IOSCO and the FSB should be complementary. IOSCO brings deep expertise in securities markets and activities; the FSB brings a system-wide perspective across sectors and jurisdictions. Together, those perspectives can help identify where risks are building and, crucially, how they might spread.

Our objective should be stronger cooperation, better information exchange and earlier consideration of emerging vulnerabilities. Financial stability is not achieved by predicting every crisis with precision. It is achieved by building markets and institutions that are sufficiently transparent, resilient and connected to competent oversight that shocks do not become unnecessary crises.

IOSCO has a central role in that effort. I look forward to continuing our work together.

FSB recommends Türkiye further strengthens its regulatory framework for crypto-assets and stablecoins

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Ref: 15/2026

  • Peer review finds Turkish authorities have made meaningful progress in enhancing the regulation, supervision and oversight of crypto-assets.
  • Further steps are warranted to reinforce Türkiye’s framework and improve alignment with the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities.
  • The FSB recommends Türkiye operationalises a financial stability monitoring framework, establishes a regime for stablecoins, strengthens supervision and enforcement, and promotes cross-border cooperation and information sharing.

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) today published its second Peer Review of Türkiye, examining the country’s progress in implementing the FSB recommendations for the regulation and supervision of crypto-asset activities, including stablecoins.

Since the publication of the Thematic Review on the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities in 2025, the Turkish authorities have made meaningful progress in strengthening the regulation, supervision and oversight of crypto-asset markets and activities. Authorities have brought a large part of the crypto-asset market within the regulatory perimeter, introducing registration and licensing requirements for crypto-asset service providers (CASPs). Moreover, structural safeguards, such as strict custody separation, and the prohibition on the use of crypto-assets for domestic payments, limit some of the risk transmission channels into payments and banking.

This regulatory framework allows authorities to better understand the business models of CASPs and the channels through which financial stability risks could arise. Authorities have also operationalised a centralised data platform for monitoring crypto-asset activities.

However, further steps are warranted to reinforce the country’s regulatory framework and improve alignment with the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities.

Building on these achievements, the FSB recommends that Turkish authorities further enhance crypto-asset and stablecoin regulation and supervision by operationalising a framework for financial stability monitoring, establishing a dedicated regime for stablecoins, strengthening supervision and enforcement, and promoting effective cross-border cooperation and information sharing.

Notes to editors

At the G20’s request, the FSB has led international work on the financial stability risks of crypto-assets since 2018. In July 2023, it finalised a global regulatory framework made up of two sets of recommendations: one for crypto-asset activities and markets, and a revised one for global stablecoin arrangements. The FSB’s 2025 thematic peer review found welcome progress in putting the framework into practice, but also highlighted significant gaps and inconsistencies across jurisdictions, and called on them to prioritise full and consistent implementation.

FSB member jurisdictions have committed to undergo periodic peer reviews to evaluate their adherence to international financial standards. To fulfil this responsibility, the FSB has established a regular programme of country and thematic peer reviews of its member jurisdictions. As part of this commitment, Türkiye volunteered to undergo a peer review in 2026. A schedule of country peer reviews, as well as all completed peer review reports, are available on the FSB website.

The FSB coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory, and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts. The FSB also conducts outreach with approximately 70 other jurisdictions through its six Regional Consultative Groups.

The FSB is chaired by Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England. The FSB Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.

Peer Review of Türkiye

| PDF full text (609 KB)

Despite meaningful progress, Türkiye’s authorities need to make further steps to reinforce the regulatory framework and improve alignment with the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities.

Turkish authorities have made meaningful progress in enhancing the regulation, supervision and oversight of crypto-asset markets and activities in recent years.

The FSB’s 2025 thematic peer review on the implementation of its global regulatory framework for crypto-asset activities showed that Türkiye had finalised a regulatory framework for crypto assets, although not for stablecoins. Since then, authorities have brought a large part of the crypto-asset market within the regulatory perimeter, introducing registration and licensing requirements for crypto-asset service providers (CASPs). Moreover, structural safeguards, such as strict custody separation, and the prohibition on the use of crypto-assets for domestic payments, limit some of the risk transmission channels into payments and banking.

This regulatory framework allows authorities to better understand the business models of CASPs and the channels through which financial stability risks could arise. Authorities have also operationalised a centralised data platform for monitoring crypto-asset activities.

The FSB recommends further steps to reinforce Türkiye’s regulatory framework and improve alignment with the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities, focusing in particular on operationalising a framework for financial stability monitoring, establishing a dedicated regime for stablecoins, strengthening supervision and enforcement, and promoting effective cross-border cooperation and information sharing.

FSB Regional Consultative Group for Europe meets in Bern

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Regional Consultative Group for Europe (RCG Europe) met on 2–3 November 2026 in Bern, hosted by the Swiss National Bank. The meeting brought together senior officials from central banks, financial authorities and regulatory bodies across the region to discuss key financial stability topics.

Co-chaired by Antoine Martin, Vice-Chairman of the Swiss National Bank’s Governing Board, and Marja Nykänen, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Finland, the meeting covered:

  • An update on the FSB’s 2026 work programme and a look ahead to priorities for 2027;
  • Global and regional financial vulnerabilities, including vulnerabilities associated with European sovereign bond markets and cyber risks amplified by advanced artificial intelligence (AI) models;
  • Crisis preparedness and public liquidity support, including funding in resolution as well as central bank liquidity facilities for solvent firms;
  • RCG Europe members-institutions’ work on financial stability vulnerabilities associated with extreme weather events, including on  natural catastrophe insurance protection gaps.

The meeting featureded a panel session on regulatory and supervisory modernisation. Members discussed the FSB’s proposed principles for modernising regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including their applicability in the European context. Members also discussed areas for further regional engagement and provided input for FSB Plenary discussions.SB’s proposed principles for modernising regulatory and supervisory frameworks, including their applicability in the European context. Members also discussed areas for further regional engagement and provided input for FSB Plenary discussions.

Strengthening the crisis-preparedness community in an interconnected world

1. Introduction

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

It is a pleasure to be here in Berlin and to join you for the closing reflections of this conference.

Today, we have looked at how digitalisation is changing financial services and what this means for deposit insurers, resolution authorities and the wider financial safety net. The changes are happening quickly. New technologies and business models are changing how people hold and transfer money, while new players are becoming part of an already highly interconnected financial system.

For those of us responsible for crisis preparedness, this presents a real challenge. We need to keep pace with these developments without losing sight of the risks we have been dealing with for years. The financial crisis taught us important lessons and led to stronger frameworks, but the environment in which they operate continues to change.

The question is not whether we can anticipate every future crisis.

We cannot.

It is whether our frameworks, institutions and cooperation arrangements are ready for a more interconnected and less predictable world.

I would like to use these final remarks to draw together some of the themes discussed during the conference and consider what they mean for the policy agenda ahead.

2. A new, riskier environment

The financial crisis of 2008 fundamentally changed how we think about financial stability. We strengthened supervision, developed new resolution regimes and reinforced deposit insurance. Together, these efforts have made the financial system better equipped to deal with crises.

But the world in which these arrangements must operate is changing rapidly. We are no longer dealing simply with incremental change. In some areas, change is radical.

Digital technology is transforming financial services, creating new business models and bringing entirely new actors into the market. Stablecoins, for instance, challenge established assumptions about how money is held and transferred, and about where financial intermediation takes place.

The pace is striking. Think of artificial intelligence: in just a few years, it has moved from a relatively specialised field to a global phenomenon, reshaping business models and raising fundamental questions about cybersecurity and financial stability. Developments that begin as experiments can become global concerns within a year or two — sometimes faster.

Innovation is welcome, clearly! But it also raises questions about where risks arise, how they spread, and whether our frameworks remain fit for purpose.

Technology is changing the risks, too. Digital banking allows deposits to move at extraordinary speed. Cyber threats are growing, while our reliance on common technology providers creates new points of vulnerability. The global IT outage caused by a faulty CrowdStrike update in July 2024 showed how a disruption at a single provider can affect services across countries.

More recently, last week’s Revolut outage offers another illustration: on 20 October, a disruption linked to a Google Cloud failure in London affected Revolut’s app, card payments, transfers and cash withdrawals, alongside services at several other financial institutions, highlighting how an incident at a shared technology provider can disrupt critical financial services across multiple firms.

And these developments unfold against a backdrop of geopolitical tensions and growing physical risks. Disruptions to energy, communications or other critical infrastructure can have consequences far beyond the sector in which they originate.

Nor are the risks exclusively new or technological. Traditional financial vulnerabilities are also becoming more acute. High levels of public debt, excessive leverage and growing financing needs are putting pressure on financial markets. Bond- and equity markets volatility and the risk of abrupt repricing could expose liquidity vulnerabilities and amplify stress across the financial system.

These developments remind us that we must remain alert to familiar financial risks even as we prepare for new ones.

The real challenge is that these risks do not operate in isolation. They interact, amplify one another and can spread across institutions, markets and sectors. New risks do not make old ones disappear; they change how familiar vulnerabilities may develop into a crisis.

The challenge is therefore twofold: to keep pace with a changing financial system, while ensuring that we remain prepared for the risks we already know.

Let’s then explore this new environment through three questions: are we looking at the right perimeter? Are we focusing on the right risks? And are our tools and arrangements fit for this new world?

3. Are we looking at the right perimeter?

Over the years, we built a moat around banks. They gained in resilience, but risk has not just vanished. It has migrated to other corners of the financial system.

The question is whether the perimeter of our moat is still fit for purpose.

Here, the resolution framework has an important strength: it focuses our attention on critical functions and services, and the systemic firms that provide them.

Identifying these functions and firms provides a useful methodological tool for the wider financial safety net.

We need to keep scanning the financial system, outside of the banking system, as a whole, asking ourselves if we can identify more critical functions and services and the firms or arrangements on which they depend — including beyond banking.

Very simply, we need to ask ourselves. Will the demise of the interruption of this service have a knock-on effect that can eventually destabilise financial stability?

Indeed, resolution regimes already extend to other important parts of the financial system, including central counterparties and insurers. But we cannot stop there. New players and new arrangements continue to emerge, and the time it takes for an activity to become significant can be remarkably short.

The question of what is a deposit? is a perfect illustration of this challenge from deposit insurance standpoint. Stablecoins, tokenised deposits, deposit-placement platforms and sweep arrangements are changing how money is held, transferred and intermediated. They invite us to look beyond familiar labels and ask what the underlying claim is, who stands behind it, and what protection is available if something goes wrong.

IADI deserves credit for the agility with which it is examining these questions. Its work on digitalisation looks at how new products and intermediaries may affect the boundaries of deposit insurance, as well as public awareness, depositor behaviour and the operational resilience of deposit insurers.1

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has also contributed through its recommendations on global stablecoin arrangements, including the need for appropriate recovery and resolution plans.

These challenges underline the importance of coordination across the crisis-preparedness continuum — a point I will return to.

Stablecoins are just one example. The broader lesson is that we must not take the current perimeter of our attention for granted. We should use the methodological tools at our disposal to identify whether we may be overlooking a critical service or player.

Moving on to my next question.

4. Are we focusing on the right risks?

The challenge is not simply that new risks are emerging. It is that risks increasingly interact, amplify one another and spread across institutions, markets and sectors in ways that are difficult to anticipate.

Traditional financial risks have not disappeared. Market volatility, excessive debt, liquidity pressures and solvency concerns remain important sources of vulnerability. These risks are particularly acute at the moment.

The environment in which they can materialise has also become more

challenging. Financial institutions are interconnected, markets can reprice rapidly, and stress can spread through channels that may not be immediately apparent.

Recent episodes have illustrated how vulnerabilities outside the banking sector can transmit stress across the financial system. The market turmoil of March 2020, the failure of Archegos in 2021 and the dislocation in the UK gilt market in September 2022 showed how leverage, liquidity mismatches and pressures in non-bank financial intermediation can have wider consequences. Risks do not necessarily emerge where we expect them, or remain confined to the institutions in which they first appear.

But are we looking at the right risks if we focus only on financial vulnerabilities? I would argue that we must also give greater attention to operational incidents.

Round-the-clock payments, frontier AI models and growing reliance on common technology providers can increase the speed and scale at which an incident affects the financial system. A severe cyberattack or technology outage may threaten not only an individual bank, but also a third-party provider on which several institutions depend for critical services. The consequences may extend beyond the institutions directly affected, disrupting services and raising market integrity and financial stability concerns simultaneously.

This brings me to an important distinction. Preparing for these incidents cannot be primarily about prevention. Prevention remains essential, but we must also start from the assumption that, at some point, it will fail. What happens if a cyberattack succeeds in taking a bank offline, or interrupts a critical service on which several institutions rely? How do we maintain or restore that service? How do authorities act when the systems and information they depend on are themselves compromised?

These are not hypothetical questions for crisis management. Consider a severe ICT incident that compromises the reliability of a bank’s data. If the bank is experiencing significant liquidity outflows but its liquidity position cannot be established with confidence, authorities may face difficult decisions about whether the bank is failing or likely to fail, and what action is required. Waiting for reliable data may allow its financial position and franchise value to deteriorate further. Acting on incomplete information also carries risks.

The challenge, therefore, is to understand how operational incidents can translate into financial instability, how their effects may spread, and how authorities can respond when prevention and containment are no longer sufficient. This requires us to connect vulnerability assessments and supervisory intelligence more closely with crisis preparedness, identifying where remedial or containment measures may limit wider spillovers while also preparing for the possibility that disruption cannot be contained.

This is a key concern in the work of the Resolution Steering Group. We need to consider how severe operational incidents could affect the execution of resolution strategies, and how authorities can remain able to take timely decisions and coordinate effectively under difficult conditions. The focus must be on practical readiness, not simply on the existence of preventive safeguards.

So, are we looking at the right risks? Yes, provided that our understanding of risk includes not only the likelihood of a shock, but also our ability to manage its consequences. Alongside traditional financial vulnerabilities, operational incidents must be part of our crisis-preparedness agenda. And that means preparing not only to prevent disruption, but also to maintain or restore critical functions when disruption occurs.

This brings us to the next question: are our tools and arrangements fit for this new world?

5. Are our tools and arrangements fit for this new world?

The Key Attributes provide a strong international standard for resolving failing financial institutions while preserving their critical functions and limiting reliance on public funds.

The problem is that yet they are not fully implemented.

Thus, for ensuring that our tools are fit-for-purpose, the first priority is implementing the framework we have. The FSB’s recent report on public sector backstop funding is a timely reminder of the work that remains. Only four of the 19 jurisdictions assessed were found fully compliant overall with Key Attribute 6 on funding in resolution.

The EU Banking Union, for instance, was not among them.2

This matters because resolution is not only about allocating losses and recapitalising a bank. It is also about ensuring that the bank has sufficient liquidity to continue operating while confidence is restored. A resolution strategy can be sound on paper, but difficult to execute if the bank cannot meet its payment obligations or markets doubt that it can do so.

The events of March 2023 brought this challenge into sharp focus.

Liquidity backstops remain a common challenge for resolution authorities and deposit guarantee schemes alike. We need credible arrangements that can provide liquidity at the necessary scale and speed, with clear responsibilities, appropriate safeguards and a realistic plan for recovering any losses.

In Europe, the Commission’s recent work on the competitiveness of the banking sector has opened a discussion on how to strengthen liquidity in resolution and deposit protection across the Banking Union.3

Interestingly, the same report also hints at the fact that the Single Resolution Fund could take on a deposit insurance role for the largest banks and provide liquidity support to national deposit guarantee schemes (DGS).

DGS and resolution authorities would be even more entangled within the continuum of the crisis management framework.

I do believe that a more integrated arrangement could strengthen the link between resolution and deposit protection, but its design will matter. Responsibilities, safeguards and the relationship between funding arrangements must be clear.

This leads me to the second priority: work better together. Make the frameworks work together. We need to strengthen cooperation across the crisis-preparedness community.

Crisis management does not begin when a bank fails, nor does it end with a resolution decision. It spans prevention, early intervention, recovery, resolution and the restoration of confidence. Preparedness therefore requires cooperation across this continuum, as well as across borders.

The revised IADI Core Principles recognise this clearly. Principle 17 addresses cooperation and coordination among safety-net participants, while Principle 18 focuses on cross-border cooperation and information sharing. This is something we have very clear in mind at the FSB with the Crisis Preparedness Strategic Review. Roundtables that bring the right people together are essential to keeping policy current and ensuring that we learn from one another. And I cannot help noticing that the panel immediately following this speech does exactly that: bringing the relevant perspectives into the same conversation.

At the international level, we need to understand not only where risks are building, but how they might spread, which institutions and services could be affected, and what coordinated action may be needed. This also means making the best use of the work of different standard-setting bodies, while avoiding duplication.

IADI’s own forward agenda captures this spirit. It recognises that digital innovation crosses borders and can blur the boundaries between banking and the wider financial system, meaning that deposit insurers cannot address these challenges in isolation. IADI therefore commits to strengthening collaboration with other international standard-setters and stakeholders.4 The same logic applies to crisis preparedness more broadly: no single authority or standard-setter can fully understand or manage risks that cut across mandates and sectors.

At the SRB, strengthening cooperation has been one of my priorities, both within the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and between the SRM and the Single Supervisory Mechanism. For instance, following the agreement on the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance reform (CMDI), we immediately reached out to our colleagues in the European deposit guarantee community to build closer working relationships.

The objective is practical: to ensure that our respective arrangements fit together and that we can act in a coordinated way when a crisis unfolds. The same commitment applies internationally, where cross-border banking groups require authorities to prepare together, exchange information and understand how their actions may affect one another.

The third priority is to keep our framework up to date. Given the global nature of these threats, closing gaps requires faster, more coordinated international policy development and exchange of experience.

The FSB’s Crisis Preparedness Strategic Review recognises this need, highlighting the importance of connecting vulnerability assessments more closely with crisis preparedness and bringing the relevant authorities and standard-setting bodies together.5

As SRB Chair, I rely on the FSB’s analysis and conclusions to identify gaps and draw lessons from practices across jurisdictions.

So do my counterparts.

Sharing analyses, standards and best practices is an invaluable input to keeping our toolkit fit for purpose.

This is why, at a recent meeting of the Resolution Steering Group,

we brought these issues to the table, exchanging experience on stablecoin crisis management and responses to operational incidents.

6. Conclusion

The challenges facing the financial safety net are becoming more complex. Risks are evolving, new actors are emerging, and shocks can spread across institutions and sectors with remarkable speed. But the answer is not to discard the frameworks we have built.

We need to keep the perimeter under review, understand how risks interact, implement the standards we already have, and strengthen cooperation across the crisis-preparedness community. We must also be prepared for the moments when prevention fails — when critical functions are threatened and authorities need to act under pressure and uncertainty.

No institution can deliver this alone. Deposit insurers, resolution authorities, supervisors, central banks and international standard-setters each have a role to play. Our task is to make sure that these roles reinforce one another, and that our collective arrangements remain credible when they are needed most.

Ultimately, resilience is not just about preventing crises. It is about ensuring that, when a crisis comes, we are ready to respond together.

  1. IADI (2026), Digitalisation and Deposit Insurance: IADI Preliminary Views and Forward Agenda, July. ↩︎
  2. FSB (2026), Thematic Review on Public Sector Backstop Funding Mechanisms: Peer review report, October. ↩︎
  3. European Commission (2026), Competitiveness of the Banking Sector and the Single Market in Banking. ↩︎
  4. IADI (2026). ↩︎
  5. FSB (2026), Strategic Review of FSB Crisis Preparedness Activities, February. ↩︎

FSB Regional Consultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa meets in Maseru

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Regional Consultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa (RCG SSA) met on 23–24 October 2026 in Maseru, Lesotho, hosted by the Central Bank of Lesotho. The meeting brought together senior officials from central banks, financial authorities and regulatory bodies in the region to discuss key financial stability topics.

Co-chaired by Lesetja Kganyago, Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, and Denny Kalyalya, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, the meeting covered a range of issues, including:

  • Global and regional financial vulnerabilities, including the transmission of global policy uncertainty and economic fragmentation to the region.
  • Regulatory and supervisory modernisation and the applicability of the FSB’s proposed principles in the Sub-Saharan African context.
  • Climate-related data gaps and insurance protection gaps.
  • The cybersecurity and financial stability implications of artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
  • Regional priorities in view of the FSB’s 2027 work programme.

Members also discussed cross-RCG coordination and key messages from the Sub-Saharan Africa region to the FSB Plenary.